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Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause
You Headaches? The Dangerous Interaction
between the DSM-5 and Employment Law
Douglas A. Hass*
INTRODUCTION
Since its first publication in 1952, the American Psychiatric
Association’s (“APA” or the “Association”) Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM” or the “Manual”) 1 has long served
as the primary reference for mental health disorders not only for
medical practitioners, but also for state and federal courts and
government agencies like the Social Security Administration and
Veterans Administration. In 1994, the APA published the fourth edition
of the DSM, or DSM-IV, with only minor “text revisions” in 2000. In
May 2013, for the first time in nearly twenty years, the APA plans to
publish an entirely new edition. 2 As proposed, the DSM-5 (the
Association plans to abandon using Roman numerals) 3 would
significantly expand a number of existing psychological disorders and
add several new ones. The DSM-IV, like previous editions of the DSM,
has long served as a primary authority for the legal community. The
new Manual is still somewhat of an unknown, both in terms of content
* Labor and Employment Attorney, Franczek Radelet, PC, Chicago, Illinois; Associate
Faculty, College of Business and Professional Studies, Ashford University; J.D. 2008, Indiana
University Maurer School of Law—Bloomington. Special thanks to my wife, Peach, without
whom none of this would be possible or worthwhile. An early draft of this Article was presented
at the Seventh Annual Labor and Employment Law Colloquium hosted by Loyola University
Chicago School of Law and Northwestern University School of Law in September 2012, where I
received invaluable feedback from colleagues. All errors and oversights are solely my own.
1. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. The DSM-IV is the current edition of the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Although the
current version is technically the 2000 text revision (the “DSM-IV-TR”) rather than the 1994
version of DSM-IV, legal and agency practitioners rarely differentiate between the two.
Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, this Article will rely on the 2000 text revision and refer to it
only as the DSM-IV.
2. Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, DSM-5 Publication Date Moved to May 2013 (Dec.
10, 2009), http://www.dsm5.org/Newsroom/Documents/09-65%20DSM%20Timeline.pdf.
3. Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, APA Modifies DSM Naming Convention to Reflect
Publication Changes (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/DSM-Name-Change.pdf.
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and potential impact.
The APA originally published proposed
diagnostic criteria and assessment instruments on the DSM-5 website. 4
The APA’s Board of Trustees subsequently adopted the final DSM-5 on
December 2, 2012, but offered little detail in its announcement and
papered over the closed nature of the Manual’s development. 5 The
Board’s approval did little to quell controversies over the DSM-5’s
impending publication. 6
Significant proposed revisions to a wide range of mental impairments
in the final public draft of the DSM-5 indicate that the legal
community’s relationship with the DSM may be forced to change, given
the implications that changes in the DSM-5 may have for claims under
laws like the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (regarding claims
of “disability” and requests for reasonable accommodations), Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (regarding definitions of a “serious
illness”), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and even
state statutes and workers compensation laws (regarding whether an
illness is work related).
The great weight given to the DSM-IV is often overlooked outside of
the medical field. However, as this Article explains, the DSM-IV’s
definitions of mental disorders and their severity have frequently served
as references for courts and administrative agencies looking to interpret
statutes and regulations and to apply the law to factual scenarios. Even
if a DSM-IV-based diagnosis has not always presumptively meant an
employee was covered under various employment laws, the legal
community must not overlook the potential impact of the new DSM-5
on employment laws. The DSM-5 will likely impact whether
4. DSM-5: The Future of Psychiatric Diagnosis, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.
org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
5. See Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, American Psychiatric Association Board of
Trustees Approves DSM-5 (Dec. 1, 2012) [hereinafter APA Approves DSM-5]. Notwithstanding
the interaction described in note 4 above, and the criticisms about the closed and secret process by
the DSM-5’s critics discussed in this Article, the APA’s press release nonetheless claimed that the
DSM-5 development process was “open and inclusive.” Similarly, although the press release
claimed that “the DSM-5 Task Force and Work Groups reviewed and considered each response”
from the public, and “made revisions where warranted,” it failed to describe any such
considerations or revisions. For example, the December 2012 release confirmed the removal of
the “bereavement exclusion” from the definition Major Depressive, discussed in Part IV infra.
This important definitional revision is unchanged from the last public draft criteria.
6. See, e.g., Allen Frances, One Last Chance for the APA to Make the DSM-5 Safer,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allen-frances/one-lastchance-for-the-apa-to-make-the-dsm-5-safer_b_2294868.html; Peter Whoriskey, Antidepressants
to Treat Grief? Psychiatry Panelists with Ties to Drug Industry Say Yes, WASH. POST (Dec. 26,
2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-26/business/36015527_1_drug-companiesantidepressants-wellbutrin (discussing criticisms of the APA’s removal of the “bereavement
exclusion”).
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employees can bring claims under the ADA, FMLA, ADEA, and
various state statutes.
This Article discusses the major role that the DSM standards play for
legal practitioners and the danger that overly expansive definitions of
mental disorders could pose to employers and employees. Part I
discusses the history and background of the DSM and its development
into a de facto legal treatise. Next, Part II highlights the strengths and
weaknesses of the DSM-IV as a legal text. Part III then explains the
dangerous interaction between the ADA Amendments Act and the
proposed DSM-5. In Part IV, the Article highlights the challenges and
difficulties that certain changes—from a proposed “Mild
Neurocognitive Disorder” to the inclusion of deviant behavior in the
definition of a mental disorder—could cause employers, employees,
courts, and even federal agencies in applying employment and disability
laws, particularly the ADA. Finally, to reduce the possibly unintended
consequences of overly expansive definitions, Part V summarizes
specific approaches that courts, employers, employees, and legal
practitioners should rely on to reduce any potential confusion and
burdens caused by the release of the DSM-5.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DSM INTO A DE FACTO LEGAL TREATISE
Mental health practitioners, insurance companies, and lawyers
practicing employment law, disability law, and other related areas, use
the DSM and have elevated it to the level of a de facto legal treatise. 7
The Manual contains uniform psychiatric standards developed by the
APA that define and classify mental and emotional disorders. The DSM
also establishes detailed criteria that medical professionals use to
uniformly identify mental conditions, evaluate symptoms, establish
diagnoses, and decide on appropriate treatment. 8
A. Early Development
Prior to the 1920s, the psychiatric field often inconsistently applied
diagnostic categories for mental disorders. 9 The inconsistencies from
practitioner to practitioner led to a movement to create a standardized
framework for diagnosing mental and emotional disorders and to use
uniform terminology and classifications. 10 In 1928, the New York
7. See infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which professionals
use the DSM within the legal community).
8. DSM-IV, supra note 1.
9. ANTHONY L. LABRUZZA & JOSÉ M. MÉNDEZ-VILLARRUBIA, USING DSM-IV: A
CLINICIAN’S GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 13 (2d ed. 1997).
10. Id.
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Academy of Medicine held a National Conference on the Nomenclature
of Diseases in order to address the concerns of this movement. 11 In
1932, the Conference published the first edition of A Standard
Classified Nomenclature of Disease (SCND). 12 The SCND’s first
edition focused on standardizing and labeling severe neurological and
psychiatric disorders that practitioners had identified in mental
patients. 13
With the SCND, mental health practitioners could, for the first time,
apply a uniform approach to the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric
disorders. However, the SCND’s limited diagnostic categories proved
insufficient to diagnose the range of mental disorders exhibited by
soldiers returning from World War II. 14 In fact, more than 90% of the
symptoms that military psychiatrists observed in veterans fell outside
the SCND’s diagnostic categories. 15 To account for this broader range
of disorders in World War II veterans, the United States Army and
Navy sought to expand on the SCND standards. 16 This effort
culminated in the Veterans Administration’s creation of a separate,
comprehensive psychiatric standard in 1946. 17 Relying heavily on the
Veterans Administration’s standard, the sixth edition of the
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-6), published in 1948, for
the first time included a section on mental disorders. 18
Once again, the psychiatric community faced divergent standards and
terminology, including the SCND, the Veterans Administration’s
standard, and the ICD-6. In response, the APA established the
Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics to review the differing
standards. 19 In 1952, the Committee published its findings and
conclusions as the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 14. For instance, the ICD-6, discussed infra note 18, and the DSM-I, discussed
infra note 20, created the first formulations of what is now known as post-traumatic stress
disorder, or PTSD. The ICD-6 termed the disorder “acute situational maladjustment,” while the
DSM-I referred to it as “transient situational personality disturbance.”
15. LABRUZZA & MÉNDEZ-VILLARRUBIA, supra note 9, at 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Originally known as the International Classification of Causes of Death, the ICD’s
sixth edition effectively supplanted the SCND. History of the Development of the ICD, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/HistoryOfICD.pdf (last visited Sept. 27,
2012). The ICD was subsequently harmonized with the diagnostic codes and terminology used
by the DSM. See WILLIAM H. REID & MICHAEL G. WISE, DSM-IV TRAINING GUIDE 6 (1995)
(discussing harmonization between the ICD and the DSM).
19. LABRUZZA & MÉNDEZ-VILLARRUBIA, supra note 9, at 14.
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of Mental Disorders, or DSM-I. 20
B. Expanding the DSM: From DSM-I to DSM-IV
The Association’s release of DSM-I, however, did not quell the
controversy over divergent standards. Instead, DSM-I introduced more
controversy and confusion, in large part due to differences in its
classification system and the one used by the ICD-6 (and, in 1955, the
ICD-7). 21 To address these concerns, in 1968 the APA and the World
Health Organization’s Eighth Revision Conference published the DSMII and ICD-8 as a collaborative effort aimed at harmonizing the
competing classification systems. 22 The DSM-II, using a hierarchy of
classifications that operated from the top down, divided mental
disorders into psychoses and nonpsychoses. It then subdivided
psychotic disorders into organic versus functional categories, while
separating nonpsychotic disorders into neuroses, personality disorders,
and mental retardation. Each classification acted as a subordinate of the
one above it, mirroring the biological process of evolution (i.e., a topdown classification system). 23
A taxonomy built to classify organisms in a single species was a poor
fit for multifaceted psychiatric diagnoses.
The hierarchical
classifications proved both ambiguous—the differences between
neurotic and psychotic disorders were poorly defined—and overly
restrictive—the classifications limited clinicians’ ability to diagnose
patients with multiple disorders. For example, under the DSM-II, a
psychiatrist could not diagnose a patient with both an organic disorder
and schizophrenia because they occupied different branches of the
DSM-II’s top-down hierarchy. 24
In 1980, with the impending release of ICD-9, the APA again revised
the DSM. 25 The DSM-III eliminated the hierarchical classifications
found in DSM-II and created new diagnostic categories centered on
grouping disorders based on similar kinds of symptoms—including
Mood, Anxiety, Somatoform, and Dissociative Disorders—in a

20. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(1st ed. 1952).
21. LABRUZZA & MÉNDEZ-VILLARRUBIA, supra note 9, at 14.
22. REID & WISE, supra note 18, at 4. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC &
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) (stating that the goal of the ICD-8
is to unify varying standards).
23. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV OPTIONS BOOK: WORK IN PROGRESS 1 (1991).
24. Id.
25. REID & WISE, supra note 18, at 4; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].
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multiaxial system. 26 Additionally, the DSM-III allowed for the first
time the possibility of multiple diagnoses, further distancing itself from
the hierarchies defined in the DSM-I and DSM-II. 27
To coincide with the release of the ICD-10, the APA again revised
the DSM in 1994. 28 The DSM-IV, the most comprehensive diagnostic
manual to date, made numerous changes and additions to the DSM-III. 29
For example, the DSM-IV provided for psychosocial and environmental
problems that influence the diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of
mental disorders. 30 These factors included major (often negative) life
events, familial or other interpersonal stressors, and a lack of social
support or personal resources. 31 A major change in the DSM-IV from
previous versions of the Manual was the addition of a clinical
significance criterion to almost half of all the diagnostic categories. 32
II. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE DSM AS A LEGAL TEXT
A. DSM-IV: A Critical Diagnostic Tool, but Not a Medical “Bible”
Even before the APA began developing the DSM-5, the DSM-IV
faced its own wave of criticism from scholars, particularly on the
development of the diagnostic categories. 33 Critics also complained of
political pressure on the APA’s process for creating the DSM-IV. 34
However, and notwithstanding the deference that the legal community

26. DSM-III, supra note 25.
27. Id.
28. REID & WISE, supra note 18, at 5.
29. The Association had made minor revisions to the DSM-III in 1987. AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987).
30. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at 28 (provided in Axis IV).
31. See Ruth Ross et al., Gender Issues in DSM-IV, in 14 REVIEW OF PSYCHIATRY 205, 209
(John M. Oldham & Michelle B. Riba eds., 1995) (discussing the factors that influence the
general treatment of mental disorders).
32. See generally John M. Oldham, Personality Disorders, in 3 FOCUS 372 (2005).
33. See, e.g., James J. Strain, Psychiatric Diagnostic Dilemmas in the Medical Setting, 39
AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 764, 766–67 (2005) (criticizing attempts in the DSM-IV-TR and
previous editions to develop diagnostic systems to categorize and explain mental illness); Dr.
Randall D. Marshall et al., Review and Critique of the New DSM-IV Diagnosis of Acute Stress
Disorder, 156 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1677 (1999). See also HERB KUTCHINS & STUART A.
KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY: DSM: THE PSYCHIATRIC BIBLE AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (2003) (broadly criticizing the application of mental illness labels to normal life
processes).
34. See, e.g., John Z. Sadler & Bill Fulford, Should Patients and Their Families Contribute to
the DSM-V Process?, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 133, 134 (2004) (stating that the creation of
DSM-IV-TR was hampered by lobbying and partisan politics); accord John Z. Sadler et al., On
Values in Recent American Psychiatric Classification, 19 J. MED. & PHIL. 261, 261–62 (1994)
(explaining that DSM-IV-TR authors paid little attention to value considerations).
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often gives the DSM, 35 the DSM-IV is simply a consensus-built medical
text with the attendant limits. 36 It is not a psychiatric “bible.” 37 The
APA appoints subject matter experts on a particular diagnosis to a
committee and tasks them with developing a consensus on how the
literature and research define the criteria for a certain diagnosis. 38 The
committees develop and revise diagnoses in each subsequent edition of
the Manual based on research and clinical experience. 39
Accordingly, the DSM is useful when classifying patients for
insurance, research, or treatment purposes. The Manual serves
physicians, patients, and insurers alike when evaluating whether a
patient meets certain diagnostic criteria required for a referral, health
benefits, or insurance coverage. Researchers can use the DSM to treat
patients dispersed both geographically and across multiple studies to
ensure that they evaluate similar patients using specific, predefined
diagnostic criteria—an important and obvious issue for treatment
research. The DSM-IV’s multiaxial assessment also increases the ease
with which practitioners can evaluate patients with multiple conditions
and stressors beyond a primary diagnosis using the Global Assessment
of Functioning (“GAF”) score. 40
For legal practitioners, the DSM-IV helpfully defines a mental
disorder as “a clinically significant behavioral or psychological
syndrome” that is attendant with “present distress” or “disability.” 41
Importantly, this criterion requires symptoms to cause “clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning.” 42 The DSM-IV also defines what is not
a mental disorder: “an expectable and culturally sanctioned response to
a particular event.” 43 Furthermore, the DSM-IV excludes deviant
behavior or conflicts with society from the mental disorder
35. See infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text (discussing the legal community’s views
and usage of the DSM).
36. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxiii.
37. Andrew E. Taslitz, Mental Health and Criminal Justice: An Overview, 22 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5
(2007).
38. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxiii.
39. Id. at xxxi–xxxiii.
40. See, e.g., Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 807 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2011) (defining GAF score
as a “psychiatric measure of a patient’s overall level of functioning”).
41. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxi. But see DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxx (“[I]t must be
admitted that no definition adequately specifies precise boundaries for the concept of ‘mental
disorder.’”).
42. See Robert L. Spitzer & Jerome C. Wakefield, DSM-IV Diagnostic Criterion for Clinical
Significance: Does It Help Solve the False Positives Problem?, 156 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1856
(1999).
43. See DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxi.
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classification, unless the deviance and conflicts are symptoms of
another mental disorder identified in the Manual. As discussed in Part
IV, the DSM-5 proposes to relax these important foundational
definitions in many areas.
B. DSM-IV: An Informational, Not Authoritative, Legal Text
The DSM-IV, however, is not without its weaknesses. More
specifically, the sheer number of mental disorders encompassed by the
DSM-IV can create confusion in legal contexts. 44 A comparison of the
DSM-IV with the DSM-I demonstrates one reason why: the DSM-IV
lists 297 different mental disorders, or approximately 300% more than
the DSM-I published just forty-two years earlier. 45
Unfortunately, the rapid expansion of listed mental illnesses was not
the result of improvements in medical diagnoses. 46 For example, the
DSM-IV added seventeen new sexual disorders, “despite little to no
empirical evidence of any underlying disease process that could account
for their existence.” 47 Other new diagnoses in the DSM-IV included
personality disorders, which are pervasive and rigid patterns of
maladaptive behavior. 48 Rather than objective markers, the DSM-IV
identifies personality disorders by “an enduring pattern of inner
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations
of the individual’s culture.” 49 Accordingly, psychiatrists must rely on
subjective cultural standards to diagnose these types of disorders.
Among several cautionary statements that implicitly recognize the

44. In no way should readers conflate confusion in legal environments with confusion in
medical or societal ones. Mental illnesses are real and affect millions of Americans. Sadly,
Americans with mental illnesses still face numerous burdens and stigmas in society. See Jane
Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 586–87
(2003) (describing stereotypes and stigmas associated with the mentally ill). People tend to fear
the mentally ill, discriminate against them, and view them as more likely to perpetrate violent acts
than others with only physical illnesses. Id. Even after the passage of the ADA, group insurance
plans can still provide more benefits for physical disabilities than mental disabilities without
violating that law’s anti-discrimination provisions. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
198 F.3d 1104, 1115–18 (9th Cir. 2000). While I am of the opinion that wholesale reliance on or
adoption of the DSM by legal practitioners may be dangerous, that opinion should always be
viewed in a greater societal context. Ignorance of the prevalence and devastating effects of
mental illness is a serious issue that no legal analysis of the DSM can or should diminish.
45. Compare DSM-IV, supra note 1, at 13–26 (listing all recognized disorders), with DSM-I,
supra note 20.
46. See Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: Transsubstantive Behavior and
Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67, 105–06 (2008) (tying illnesses to political
pressures and theoretical factors unsupported by clinical research).
47. Id. at 114.
48. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at 685.
49. Id. at 686.
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Manual’s limitations, the DSM-IV warns that the “assignment of a
particular diagnosis does not imply a specific level of impairment or
disability.” 50 Therefore, an individual may be depressed, and even meet
the DSM-IV’s diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder, but
those facts alone may or may not result in a level of functional
impairment warranting a medical determination of disability.
Accordingly, a diagnosis of a mental illness under the DSM-IV cannot
directly translate to a legal determination of incompetence, disability, or
lack of criminal responsibility. A murderer may have Bipolar Disorder,
Major Depressive Disorder, and various psychoses, but still be found
competent to stand trial. 51 Of course, a DSM-IV diagnosis necessarily
implies nothing about the treatment protocol for the mental illness—a
diagnosis cannot inform a court whether medication or other treatment
can help a person “control” their condition.
The lack of clarity in the DSM-IV about how to define a mental
illness, 52 particularly when combined with diagnostic subjectivity in
certain disorders, presents significant difficulties for legal practitioners
who look to the DSM either to adapt medical terminology to lay, legal
definitions, or to reach legal conclusions. 53 Even Congress has rejected
a statutory definition that would explicitly require group health plans to
adopt all DSM diagnoses. 54

50. Id. at xxxiii.
51. E.g., United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit affirmed
a district court’s finding that Jared Lee Loughner, who shot and killed federal judge John Roll
and seriously wounded Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords (among others) in January 2011, was
competent to stand trial despite multiple mental disorders. Id. at 772. The district court had
found a substantial probability that Loughner could be restored to competency through
involuntary medication. Id. at 770.
52. See DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxx (“[I]t must be admitted that no definition adequately
specifies precise boundaries for the concept of ‘mental disorder.’”).
53. See, e.g., Pierre Beumont & Terry Carney, Can Psychiatric Terminology Be Translated
into Legal Regulation? The Anorexia Nervosa Example, 38 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 819,
820 (2004).
54. As part of Public Law No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008)—a law best known for creating
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)—Congress passed the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA). The MHPAEA,
codified in relevant part at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006), requires insurance coverage for treatment
related to mental health or substance abuse to be “no more restrictive than the predominant
financial requirements applied to substantially all medical and surgical benefits covered by the
plan” and eliminated disparities between co-pays and deductibles for mental versus physical
illnesses. The original version of the bill, introduced in March 2007, explicitly required group
health plans to “include benefits for any mental health condition or substance-related disorder
included in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
published by the American Psychiatric Association.” H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2007). This
language was removed prior to the passage of the MHPAEA.
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C. Use of the DSM in Legal Contexts
Despite these weaknesses and the DSM’s admonitions that the
application of DSM-IV “categories, criteria, and textual descriptions . . .
for forensic purposes,” rather than medical ones, raises “significant risks
that diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood,” 55 the
DSM-IV has found wide application far beyond doctors’ offices and
medical journals. Courts, legislators, and government agencies have
relied on the DSM-IV as a persuasive text in a range of cases implicating
mental illness, from employment discrimination, 56 to criminal law 57
and Social Security disability, 58 and even to health plan
administration. 59 Courts have referred to the DSM as a “nationally
recognized directory of mental illness,” 60 a “reliable text,” 61 and
“specialized literature” with a rigorous process for including mental
illnesses. 62 Courts have also held that government agencies can
reasonably rely on the DSM-IV to determine eligibility for their health
plans’ disability benefits. 63
Battles over the DSM and its proper meaning have even reached
Supreme Court decisions. For example, in Atkins v. Virginia, 64 the
Court considered the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on
intellectually disabled/mentally retarded defendants. Writing for the

55. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxii–xxxiii.
56. See, e.g., Scheerer v. Potter, 443 F.3d 916, 920–21 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
“disability” in Rehabilitation Act claim in part because of the DSM-IV definition of adjustment
disorder); Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.N.H. 1995) (stating, under
section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, that “in circumstances of mental impairment, a court may
give weight to a diagnosis of mental impairment which is described in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association”); Guice-Mills v.
Derwinski, 772 F. Supp. 188, 197–98 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“A major depressive episode as described
in the [DSM-IV] constitutes ‘mental impairment’ [under the Rehabilitation Act].”), aff’d, 967 F.2d
794 (2d Cir. 1992).
57. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 774 (2006) (citing DSM-IV’s diagnostic
definition of Schizophrenia in a case regarding state insanity defense standards).
58. See, e.g., Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 807 n.1 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing the DSM-IV
definition of a GAF score—a “psychiatric measure of a patient’s overall level of functioning”—in
a disability case involving mental impairments).
59. See Fuller v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 423 F.3d 104, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing a
disability plan’s reliance on DSM-IV definitions when making disability coverage
determinations).
60. Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 804 F. Supp. 794, 803 (E.D. Va. 1992), rev’d on other
grounds, 13 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1994).
61. United States v. Danser, 110 F. Supp. 2d 807, 829 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
62. Discepolo v. Gorgone, 399 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D. Conn. 2005).
63. Dellarcirprete v. Gutierrez, 479 F. Supp. 2d 600, 605 (N.D.W.V. 2007) (“[T]he BOP’s
reliance on the DSM-IV to help determine the terms of eligibility is likewise reasonable.”)
64. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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majority, Justice Stevens referred to both the DSM-IV 65 and the joint
amicus curiae brief filed by the American Psychological Association
and the APA. 66 His opinion stated that “clinical definitions of mental
retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also
significant limitations in adaptive skills . . . that became manifest before
age 18.” 67 In dissent, Justice Scalia focused on this definition and
remarked that “the symptoms of this condition can readily be
feigned.” 68
Thus, even at the highest levels, legal practitioners and legislators
often rely heavily on the DSM-IV when making legal determinations—
in Atkins, to determine whether intellectual disability/mental retardation
can be diagnosed in a defendant; for Congress, to determine the scope
of coverage under group health plans. This overreliance, however, is
dangerous. The DSM increasingly lists sets of “hypotheses, somewhat
proved and somewhat unproved, that were reliably defined so as to be
further studied and later further refined, proved, or disproved,” rather
than listing disorders. 69 Nevertheless, the seemingly blind obeisance in
legal circles for the DSM results in practitioners, courts, and judges—
not to mention employers and employees—treating a DSM diagnosis as
a proven fact with legal consequences, rather than the hypothesis that it
often represents. 70
The DSM-IV actually cautions the legal community from attaching
too much importance to the Manual when making conclusions of law
and explains why heavy reliance is dangerous:
These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions
of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a
clinical diagnosis. In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSMIV mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal
purposes of a “mental disorder,” “mental disability,” “mental disease,”
or “mental defect.” In determining whether an individual meets a
specified legal standard (e.g., for competence, criminal responsibility,
65. See id. at 308 n.3 (quoting the APA’s definition of Mental Retardation).
66. See id. at 316 n.21 (citing the APA’s amicus curiae brief opposing the imposition of the
death penalty on offenders diagnosed with mental retardation).
67. Id. at 318.
68. Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. S. NASSIR GHAEMI, THE CONCEPTS OF PSYCHIATRY: A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO THE
MIND AND MENTAL ILLNESS 172 (2003).
70. See, e.g., id. at 53 (discussing the difficulty in reconciling psychiatry and empiricism);
Philip Thomas et al., Explanatory Models for Mental Illness: Limitations and Dangers in a
Global Context, 2 PAK. J. NEUROL. SCI. 176, 177 (2007) (discussing the lack of evidence that
links psychiatric disorders to biology); John Sorboro, The Trouble with Psychiatry, SKEPTIC
MAG., Sept. 22, 2007, at 37, 38–39 (explaining that there is not much “real evidence” to support
the claim that psychiatric disorders can be explained through biology).
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or disability), additional information is usually required beyond that
contained in the DSM-IV diagnosis. 71

The danger of overreliance on the DSM comes into clearer focus with
the expected May 2013 release of the DSM-5. To better understand this
danger, Part III presents a primer on the changes to the ADA under the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), 72 with a focus on mental
impairments.
Part IV then describes the potentially dangerous
interaction between the ADAAA and the DSM-5.
III. THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT’S DANGEROUS INTERACTION
WITH THE DSM
A. Key Changes in the ADAAA
On September 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the
ADAAA into law. 73 The Act’s most significant changes affected the
ADA’s treatment of what constitutes a “disability” and the ADA’s
definitions of “substantial limitations,” “major life activities,” and
“regarded as” disability. The ADAAA primarily addressed issues from
two ADA-related U.S. Supreme Court cases: Sutton v. United Air
Lines 74 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. 75
Sutton addressed disability discrimination claims made by two
severely myopic plaintiffs who were denied employment for failing to
satisfy minimum vision requirements based on uncorrected visual
acuity. 76 The Court held that any measures that an individual takes to
mitigate a physical or mental impairment must be considered when
determining whether an individual is “disabled.” 77 Subsequent district
and appellate court decisions relied on Sutton to find that some mental
impairments did not constitute “disabilities” where they were
adequately controlled by medication. 78
71. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxxiii.
72. See generally ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–02, 12112, 12201, 12206, & 12211 (2006)) [hereinafter
“ADAAA”].
73. Id. The Act took effect in January 2009.
74. 527 U.S. 471 (1999), overturned by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
75. 534 U.S. 184 (2002), overturned by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
76. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475–76.
77. Id. at 482.
78. See, e.g., Collins v. Prudential Inv. and Ret. Servs., 119 F. App’x 371, 378 (3d Cir. 2005)
(noting that ADD/ADHD is not a “disability” when it is corrected through medication); EEOC v.
Rite Aid Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 564, 570–71 (D. Md. 2010) (same with epilepsy); Burke v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 142 F. App’x 527, 529 (2d Cir. 2005) (same with asthma).
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Toyota considered whether an employer had failed to accommodate a
claim by a plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome. 79 The Court held that
an impairment must “prevent” or “severely restrict” a major life activity
to constitute a “substantial limitation” on that activity, 80 and that a
“major life activity” must be an activity “of central importance to daily
life.” 81 Prior to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(EEOC) publication of post-ADAAA regulations in March 2011, 82
ADA regulations had narrowly defined terms like “substantially limits”
as “unable to perform” a major life activity or “significantly restricted”
in the performance of that activity. 83
The ADAAA also allowed Congress to resolve additional
controversies raised by Court dicta, lower court decisions, and circuit
splits among the appellate courts. Pre-ADAAA courts had divided over
the issue of whether individuals covered under the ADA’s “regarded as”
disabled prong were entitled to reasonable accommodations. 84
Appellate courts had also split over whether plaintiffs who claimed they
were “regarded as” disabled also must prove that defendants had
perceived those real or imagined disabilities as “substantially
limiting.” 85
Pre-ADAAA Court law also required a mental (or physical)
impairment to have a “permanent or long term” impact. 86 Accordingly,
many district and circuit courts declined to find that an impairment
substantially limited a plaintiff if the impairment was merely episodic or
in remission. 87 Some courts went further and found that episodic or
intermittent mental disorders did not constitute a “disability” under the

79. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 187.
80. Id. at 185. Some pre-ADAAA courts held or implied that plaintiffs must have been
substantially limited in more than one major life activity to be considered “disabled” under the
ADA. See, e.g., Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 F. App’x 874, 877 (11th Cir. 2007)
(noting that the ability to drive a car might be inconsistent with an alleged disability affecting the
major life activities of thinking and communicating); Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Ctr., Inc., 443
F.3d 762, 766–67 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding a plaintiff with cerebral palsy as not “disabled” where
she was not restricted in the ability to perform a “broad range of manual tasks”).
81. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 185.
82. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1–1630.16 (2012).
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)–(ii) (2002).
84. E.g., D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing
circuit split).
85. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 490–91 (1999).
86. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 185.
87. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2001) (“To hold that a
person is disabled whenever that individual suffers from an occasional manifestation of an illness
would expand the contours of the ADA beyond all bounds.”).
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ADA. 88
Pre-ADAAA courts often questioned whether “working” could
qualify as a major life activity. 89 Although the regulations deemed
“working” as a major life activity, they required plaintiffs to clear the
significant hurdle of demonstrating that their impairments substantially
limited their abilities to perform a “class of jobs” or a “broad range of
jobs in various classes.” 90
B. Changes to the Legal Landscape in the ADAAA
1. “Disability”
The ADAAA rejected the Sutton Court’s holding, which required
employers, under the ADA, to assess a “disability” in light of measures
that mitigated mental (or physical) impairments. 91 Instead, the Act
required this assessment to be made without regard to the effects of
mitigating measures. 92
The ADAAA further clarified that an
impairment need not substantially limit more than one major life
activity to constitute a “disability.” 93 Importantly for mental illnesses,
the Act provided that an episodic or intermittent impairment would still
constitute a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity
when active. 94
Helpfully, Congress listed several examples of
mitigating measures that must not be considered in determining whether
a mental impairment constitutes a “disability,” including “medication”
and “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications.” 95
2. “Substantially Limits”
The ADAAA also rejected the Toyota Court’s holding that the ADA
required an impairment to “prevent” or “severely restrict” a major life
activity to constitute a “substantial limitation” on that activity. 96 The

88. See, e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 276 (4th Cir. 2004)
(noting that plaintiff with depression and PTSD was not substantially limited in interacting with
others where PTSD flashback episodes were “sporadic and last[ed], at most, thirty minutes”).
89. See, e.g., Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200 (noting the “conceptual difficulties inherent in the
argument that working could be a major life activity”); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (noting that
defining “major life activities” to include work may cause some conceptual difficulty).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2002).
91. See generally ADAAA, § 8 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–02, 12112, 12201, 12206, &
12211 (2006)).
92. Id. § 2(b)(2). The ADAAA did grant exceptions for the effects of eyeglasses or contact
lenses. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii)).
93. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C)).
94. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)).
95. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)).
96. See id. § 2(b)(4).
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Act also rejected the regulations’ narrow definition of “substantially
limits” as meaning “significantly restricted” in the performance of a
major life activity. 97 Instead, the ADAAA specifically directed that the
definition of “disability” be construed “in favor of broad coverage,”
consistent with the Act’s findings and purposes. 98 Further clarifying
Congress’s intent to return the ADA to its original understanding, the
Act’s findings and purposes recited that the question of “whether an
individual’s impairment constitutes a disability should not demand
extensive analysis.” 99 The Act’s findings and purposes also reflected
Congress’s expectation that the EEOC would revise the definition of
“substantially limits.” 100
3. “Major Life Activity”
Third, the ADAAA rejected Toyota’s holding that a “major life
activity” must be one of “central importance to most people’s daily
lives.” 101 Instead, the Act provided two non-exclusive lists of “major
life activities” 102—one containing traditional activities that the EEOC’s
regulations previously recognized (plus a few activities only identified
in court decisions and EEOC guidance), 103 and a second list of “major
bodily functions,” including “functions of the immune system, normal
cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory,
circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” 104 For individuals
with mental impairments, Congress helpfully included multiple
potentially relevant “major life activities” and “major bodily functions,”
including sleeping, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
neurological and brain functions. 105
4. “Regarded as” Disability
Finally, the ADAAA rejected federal courts’ requirement that
plaintiffs alleging “regarded as” disability prove that defendants
perceived their real or imagined disabilities to be “substantially
97. See id. § 2(b)(6).
98. See id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)–(B)).
99. See id. § 2(b)(5).
100. See id. § 2(b)(6).
101. See id. § 2(b)(4).
102. See id. § 4(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(B)) (listing the activities that
constitute “major life activities”).
103. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2012), with ADAAA § 4(a)(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(A)) (listing activities such as performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, and eating)).
The ADAAA explicitly (and logically) recognized “working” as a major life activity. Id.
§ 4(a)(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).
104. See ADAAA § 4(a)(2)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)).
105. See id. § 4(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(B)).
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limiting.” 106 Instead, to satisfy this prong, the Act only required
plaintiffs to prove that they suffered disability discrimination “because
of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not
the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 107
The ADAAA also provided that employers need not extend a
reasonable accommodation to individuals who merely satisfy the
“regarded as” definition of disability. 108
C. Effect of the ADAAA Regulations
For mental impairments, the ADAAA and its underlying revised
regulations provide some different interpretations that changes to the
DSM-5 could potentially exploit. Most importantly, the ADA’s
definition of “disability” after the ADAAA is to be construed broadly in
favor of coverage and does not require “extensive analysis.” 109
Reinforcing the low bar for the initial steps, the regulations state that an
impairment is a disability if it “substantially limits” the ability of an
individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people
in the general population. 110
The post-ADAAA regulations prescribe that an impairment that is
episodic or in remission is a “disability” if it would substantially limit a
major life activity when active. 111 This broader definition is critical to
proposed DSM-5 classifications of illnesses, such as Major Depressive
Disorder, which include episodic events like bereavement. Even
impairments with a brief duration can be “substantially limiting” under
the revised regulations. 112 The regulations also provide a nonexclusive
list of such potential impairments, including Major Depressive
Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, where
it will “easily be concluded” that impairments limit a major life
activity. 113 The regulations also explicitly expand the list of major life
activities, including the addition of “interacting with others.” 114 This
language establishes a presumption that many broad categories of
mental impairments will meet both the disability and substantially limits
prongs of the ADA analysis.
Additionally, the regulations state that mitigating measures are not to
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id. § 2(b)(3).
See id. § 4(a)(3)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)).
See id. § 6(a)(1)(h) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h)).
29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1(c)(4), 1630.2(k)(2) (2012).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).
Id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i).
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be considered in determining disability. 115 For mental impairments,
this excludes the consideration of the effects of medication, learned or
adaptive behaviors, or psychotherapy. 116 An individual is “regarded as”
having a disability if he is subjected to discrimination based on actual or
perceived impairment, whether or not the impairment limits (or is
perceived to limit) a major life activity. 117 While an employer is not
required to provide reasonable accommodations to individuals who are
only “regarded as” disabled under the ADA, 118 the post-ADAAA
regulations add that “regarded as” disability discrimination may arise
from adverse employment actions taken based on the symptoms of
actual or perceived impairments, or on medication used to treat such
impairments. 119
IV. BROADENING DEFINITIONS: THE PROPOSED DSM-5
A. Medical Community Criticisms of the DSM-5
After publishing text revisions to the DSM-IV in 2000, the APA
began preparing for the development of the DSM-5. 120 Just as the
DSM-IV received criticism during its development, 121 word of the
DSM-5 was met with considerable opposition from various medical and
nonmedical groups almost from the outset of the project. For example,
psychiatrist Paul Chodoff sarcastically suggested in the APA’s
Psychiatric News that the DSM-5 should adopt his proposed diagnosis
of “the human condition.” 122 With “diagnostic criteria” that included
disliking school, fidgeting, disobedience (for children), dissatisfaction
with one’s sexual performance, unhappiness, shyness, getting angry,
and playing the horses (for adults), Dr. Chodoff cynically wrote that this
diagnosis would “encourage the quest for a drug to cure the disorder of
being human.” 123 His comments underscored the psychiatric
community’s unease with the ever-expanding DSM.
Even the confidentiality agreement that the Association required

115. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vi).
116. Id. § 1630.2(j)(5)(i), (iv)–(v).
117. Id. § 1630.2(l)(1).
118. Id. § 1630.9(e).
119. Id. § 1630.2(l)(1).
120. See DSM-5 Publication Date Moved to May 2013, supra note 2 (noting that the APA will
publish a new edition of the DSM for the first time in twenty years in May 2013).
121. See supra note 34 (citing scholarly critics of the DSM-IV, particularly in regards to the
diagnostic categories).
122. Dr. Paul Chodoff, Letter to the Editor: Proposed Diagnosis, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Jan.
21, 2005), http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=108472.
123. Id.
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DSM-5 Work Group and Task Force members to sign could not escape
controversy. The agreement prohibited the disclosure of any written or
unwritten information, including notes and discussions, relating to the
members’ work on the DSM-5. 124 In 2009, Robert Spitzer and Allen
Frances, the Task Force chairs for the DSM-III and DSM-IV,
respectively, excoriated the APA’s Board of Trustees in an open letter
for allowing the DSM-5 leadership to “seal[] itself off from advice and
criticism” and engage in a “secretive and closed DSM process” that
“cannot function properly.” 125
Spitzer and Frances’s real fear, however, was the lack of quality
control in the DSM-5 process that was already spawning “damaging
public controversies.” 126 Their 2009 letter warned that the DSM-5
leadership had been “insensitive to the great risks of false positives, of
medicalizing normality, and of trivializing the whole concept of
psychiatric diagnosis.” 127 Frances later warned that the DSM-5’s
proposals could amount to a “wholesale medical imperialization of
normality [that] could potentially create tens of millions of innocent
bystanders who would be mislabeled as having a mental disorder.” 128
Other commentators cautioned that “diagnosis informs treatment
decisions,” and that even “small changes in symptom criteria” could
have “significant impacts” on treatment. 129 Shortly after the publication
of Spitzer and Frances’s letter, the APA pushed the DSM-5’s original
2012 publication date back to May 2013, ostensibly to more closely
coincide with the release of the ICD-10-CM (“Clinical Modification”),
which is due in October 2013. 130 The delay did little to change the
direction of the DSM-5 or the wealth of medical community criticism.
124. Robert L. Spitzer, DSM-V Transparency: Fact or Rhetoric?, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Mar.
6, 2009), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/10168/1385346. The Association
responded that the agreement was designed to avoid “premature conclusion and misconceptions
. . . that could damage the viability of DSM-V.” Nada L. Stotland et al., DSM-V: Open and
Transparent?: Response, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (July 18, 2008), http://psychnews.psychiatry
online.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=111946.
125. Letter from Allen Frances & Robert Spitzer to the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n Bd. of Trs.
(July 6, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/17172432/Letter-to-APA-Board-ofTrustees-July-7-2009-From-Allen-Frances-and-Robert-Spitzer.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Allen Frances, It’s Not Too Late to Save ‘Normal,’ L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, http://
articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/01/opinion/la-oe-frances1-2010mar01 [hereinafter Frances, It’s
Not Too Late].
129. Lisa Cosgrove & Harold J. Bursztajn, Toward Credible Conflict of Interest Policies in
Clinical Psychiatry, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display
/article/10168/1364672.
130. See DSM-5 Publication Date Moved to May 2013, supra note 2 (noting the planned
publication of the DSM-5 in May 2013).
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The delay and ongoing debate should have raised red flags for legal
practitioners. 131
In June 2011, the British Psychological Society lodged a highly
critical response to the proposed revisions, 132 one that a host of other
prominent psychological organizations and psychologists later adopted
in an open online petition. 133 The Society joined Spitzer and Frances’s
earlier criticism that the general public was “negatively affected by the
continued and continuous medicalization of their natural and normal
responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly have
distressing consequences which demand helping responses, but which
do not reflect illnesses so much as normal individual variation.” 134 The
Society warned that many of the putative diagnoses presented in DSM-5
were “clearly based largely on social norms, with ‘symptoms’ that all
rely on subjective judgments, with little confirmatory physical ‘signs’ or
evidence of biological causation.” 135 Like Spitzer and Frances, the
Society saw a need for “a revision of the way mental distress is thought
about, starting with recognition of the overwhelming evidence that it is
on a spectrum with ‘normal’ experience,” influenced by causal factors
such as poverty, unemployment, and trauma. 136
The Society
recommended that an ideal classification system should not be based on
“preordained diagnostic categories” but rather should “begin from the
bottom up—starting with specific experiences, problems or ‘symptoms’
or ‘complaints.’” 137
Amid the furor, Dr. William Narrow, the DSM-5 Task Force’s
Research Director, responded to some of the criticisms in an interview
with the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 138 However, his question-and-answer
131. Indeed, it was the DSM-5 Task Force’s announcement of the delayed publication that
first brought the disputes about the DSM-5 to my attention and the attention of my thencolleagues at the Social Security Administration’s Office of the General Counsel, the office
tasked with defending the agency’s disability determinations on appeal.
132. BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y, RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION: DSM-5 DEVELOPMENT (2011), available at http://apps.bps.org.uk/_publication
files/consultation-responses/DSM-5%202011%20-%20BPS%20response.pdf.
The
Society
published an updated response in June 2012. BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y, DSM-5: THE
FUTURE OF PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS (2012–FINAL CONSULTATION): BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL
SOCIETY RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (June 2012).
133. Open Letter to the DSM-5, IPETITIONS.COM, http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/dsm5/
(last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
134. RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION: DSM-5 DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 132, at 2.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id.
138. Q&A with Dr. William Narrow, Research Director for the DSM 5 Task Force,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/health/
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session with the newspaper only served to raise more red flags for
DSM-5 critics and legal practitioners. 139 Dr. Narrow explained that the
DSM-5 was necessary because the DSM-IV, completed nearly twenty
years ago, was “no longer considered up-to-date.” 140 In response to
ongoing criticism about the expansion of the DSM-5 and the fear that it
would lead to the medicalization of normal experiences and the
overdiagnosis of mental disorders, Dr. Narrow responded that the DSM5 Task Force had been vetting draft proposals against scientific findings
and field testing. He added that the Task Force had been focusing the
DSM-5 to address “concerns” that the DSM-IV was too “biologically
focused” 141—oddly the polar opposite of major criticisms from the
medical field and major media. 142 Unsurprisingly for lawyers, Dr.
Narrow responded with an entirely clinical focus to the DSM-5 criticsm,
not a legal one. 143 Dr. Narrow’s response demonstrates that not only
will medical professionals have to live with the DSM-5 (for better or for
worse), but so too will legal practitioners. Members of the legal
academy who have been invited to participate in the development of the
DSM-5 have expressed alarm and concern at some of the “vague and
unscientific” proposed modifications. 144 Unfortunately, legal
qa-with-dr-william-narrow-research-director-for-the-dsm-5-task-force-219825.
139. See, e.g., Martha J. Zackin, Psychiatric Disabilities under the ADA: Proposed Changes
to Diagnostic Tool May Result in a Broader Definition of “Disability,” LABOR & EMP’T
COMMENTARY BLOG (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/laboremployment-law/blogs/labor-employment-commentary/archive/2011/11/17/psychiatricdisabilities-under-the-ada-proposed-changes-to-diagnostic-tool-may-result-in-a-broaderdefinition-of-quot-disability-quot.aspx; Daniel Schwartz, With DSM-5 on the Way, Is It Time to
Update Definition of “Mental Disability”?, CONN. EMP’T BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012),
http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2012/02/articles/with-dsm-5-on-the-way-is-it-time-toupdate-definition-of-mental-disability/ (warning that Connecticut has specifically adopted the
DSM definitions); Douglas A. Hass & Lisa McGarrity, Could the American Psychiatric
Association Cause Employers Headaches? The Potential Impact of the DSM-5, FRANCZEK
RADELET (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-American_Psychiatric_
Association_Impact_DSM-5.html (providing a legal update to firm clients regarding the
impending DSM-5 release).
140. Q&A with Dr. William Narrow, supra note 138.
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 122–37 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Benedict Carey, Revising Book on Disorders of the Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2010, at A1 (stating that the modifications to the DSM-5 have effects in fields other than
psychiatry, such as the legal and pharmaceutical fields).
144. See generally RUTH COLKER ET AL., COMMENTS ON PROPOSED DSM-5 CRITERIA FOR
SPECIFIC LEARNING DISORDER FROM A LEGAL AND MEDICAL/SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVE,
available at http://dyslexia.yale.edu/CommentsDSM5ColkerShaywitzSimon.pdf (recommending
that the DSM-5 Task Force reverse its planned elimination of Dyslexia in favor of “Specific
Learning Disorder”); Ruth Colker, Guest Post: Learning Disability DSM-5 Mess, LEXERCISE
(June 1, 2012), http://www.lexercise.com/2012/06/learning-disability-dsm-5-mess/ (stating that
the proposed removal of dyslexia in favor of the “vague and unscientific term ‘Specific Learning
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practitioners will have far less input into its development than practicing
doctors.
An editorial by Til Wykes and Felicity Callard, from King’s College
London, neatly summarized the problems with the proposed revisions
for the DSM-5:
The current release for public consideration includes proposals for
new diagnoses—including mixed anxiety depression, binge eating,
psychosis risk syndrome and temper dysregulation disorder with
dysphoria—where the symptoms are shared with the general
population. It is also proposed that the threshold for inclusion for
some existing disorders be lowered, and a few (but not many)
diagnoses are scheduled for removal. Most of these changes imply a
more inclusive system of diagnoses where the pool of “normality”
shrinks to a mere puddle. 145

Several proposals not only risk misuse and overdiagnosis in various
populations, but also create legal concerns. The DSM-5’s proposals, as
well as other formal disorders currently under consideration by the
APA, could directly impact whether employees can bring claims under
the ADA (regarding claims of “disability” and requests for reasonable
accommodations), the FMLA (concerning definitions of a “serious
illness”), and even the ADEA and workers’ compensation laws
(questioning whether an illness is work related).
B. Legal Difficulties Presented by the DSM-5’s Proposed Changes
Against the backdrop of the medical community criticisms, proposed
changes in the DSM-5 would medicalize as disorders a number of
potentially work-related conditions that previous editions have never
identified. Official recognition of a disorder in the DSM-5 leads
directly 146 or indirectly to recognition of that disorder in claims made
pursuant to the ADA, the FMLA, workers’ compensation, and other
federal or state employment laws. Among the troubling new definitions
that the APA has proposed adding as formal disorders are Attenuated
Psychosis Syndrome, 147 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, 148 Social
Disorder’” was “alarming” and could cause “tens of thousands” of individuals to lose disability
classifications). Professor Colker is a Distinguished University Professor and the Heck-Faust
Memorial Chair in Constitutional Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
145. Til Wykes & Felicity Callard, Diagnosis, Diagnosis, Diagnosis: Towards DSM-5, 19 J.
MENTAL HEALTH 301, 302 (2010).
146. For example, Connecticut statutes explicitly refer to mental disorders as defined in “the
most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders.’” E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4a-60(d), 38a-488a, 53a-181i (2012).
147. Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/
proposedrevision/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=412 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). See also
APA Approves DSM-5, supra note 5, at 2 (listing Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome).

3_HASS

704

3/9/2013 1:33 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

Communication Disorder, 149 and Callous and Unemotional Specifier for
Conduct Disorder. 150 Other changes slated for DSM-5 include
significant modifications to existing disorders, such as Major
Depressive Disorder 151 and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. 152 The
APA is also considering the addition of other questionably supportable
disorders that were suggested by outside sources, such as Apathy
Syndrome, Internet Addiction Disorder, and Seasonal Affective
Disorder. 153
1. Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome
One of the most contentious new disorders of the new DSM-5 is
Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome, a proposal that would greatly expand
the universe of psychotic disorders officially recognized by the DSM.
Under the proposed definition, Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome would
consist of a combination of low-level psychotic symptoms, distress, and
social dysfunction that could occur as infrequently as once a week, as
long as the patient views them as “sufficiently distressing and
disabling . . . to lead them to seek help.” 154 In an early 2012 interview,
Dr. Narrow indicated that the APA had estimated that nearly 80% of
potential “attenuated psychosis syndrome” patients go undiagnosed
under the DSM-IV. 155 Official recognition of this new disorder could
lead more employees to claim that normal, job-related stress has led to a
DSM-recognized mental disorder. With the ADAAA lowering the bar
148. S 03 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/
proposedrevision/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=420 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
149. A 04 Social Communication Disorder, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.
org/proposedrevision/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=489 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
150. Q 02.1 Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/proposedrevision/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=424 (last visited
Sept. 27, 2012).
151. D 01 Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://
www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=44 (last visited April 2012);
D 02 Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.
org/ProposedRevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=45 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
152. E 05 Generalized Anxiety Disorder, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.
org/proposedrevision/pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=167 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
153. Conditions Proposed by Outside Sources, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.
dsm5.org/proposedrevisions/pages/conditionsproposedbyoutsidesources.aspx (last visited Sept.
27, 2012). See also APA Approves DSM-5, supra note 5, at 2 (listing Internet Addiction
Disorder).
154. Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome, supra note 147. Under the proposed definition, either
practitioners or patients can document the existence of these symptoms. Id.
155. See Q&A with Dr. William Narrow, supra note 138 (advocating that formal recognition
of Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome under DSM-5 “would mean a greater likelihood that clinicians
will recognize the syndrome . . . and be able to follow the symptoms over time and intervene
when needed”).
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for what constitutes a “disability” or what “substantially limits” a major
life activity, employees would receive significantly more protection
under the ADA, the FMLA, state workers compensation laws, and other
employment laws.
To the APA’s credit, its most recent revisions after its third public
comment period ending in June 2012 delayed the formal identification
of two other disorders with employment-related concerns: Attenuated
Psychosis Syndrome and Mixed Anxiety Depressive Disorder. 156 In its
final pre-publication update posted to the DSM-5 website, the Task
Force recommended these conditions “for further study,” noting that
they “require further research” before consideration as formal
disorders.” 157
2. Mild Neurocognitive Disorder
Among the most troubling proposed changes to the DSM-5 is the
addition of “Mild Neurocognitive Disorder.” Grouped with delirium,
dementia, amnesia, and other cognitive disorders, 158 the proposed
DSM-5 defines Mild Neurocognitive Disorder as involving a “modest
cognitive decline from a previous level of performance”—in other
words, a modest decline in memory—not otherwise associated with
another mental disorder, such as Delirium or Major Depressive
Disorder. 159 According to the proposed revision, Mild Neurocognitive
Disorder does not interfere with a person’s independence or activities of
daily living (including complex tasks), but “greater effort,
compensatory strategies, or accommodation may be required to
maintain independence.” 160 Notably, the only “evidence” required for
this diagnosis is the self-reported “[c]oncerns of the individual” or “a
knowledgeable informant.” 161
DSM-5 critics have rightly argued that this definition is unacceptably
156. Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome, originally named Psychosis Risk Syndrome, is
primarily diagnosed in adolescents and young adults, so its implications in the employment
context may be limited. For a discussion of the issues raised by the possible identification of this
disorder, see Allen Frances, Psychosis Risk Syndrome: Just as Risky with a New Name, PSYCHOL.
TODAY, July 30, 2010, and Johnathan Fish, Overcrowding on the Ship of Fools: Health Care
Reform, Psychiatry, and the Uncertain Future of Normality, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
181, 249–53 & nn.432–53 (2012).
157. See, e.g., Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome (Proposed for Section III of the DSM-5), AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/proposedrevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?
rid=412 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
158. See Neurocognitive Disorders, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/
ProposedRevision/Pages/NeurocognitiveDisorders.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
159. See S 03 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, supra note 148.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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broad. Allen Frances, for one, listed Mild Neurocognitive Disorder as
one of the “19 worst suggestions” for the DSM-5. 162 He argues that
adding Mild Neurocognitive Disorder risks medicalizing predictable
cognitive declines of aging. 163 Nonspecific symptoms, such as a
modest cognitive decline from a previous level of performance, are
“very common (perhaps almost ubiquitous) in people over fifty.” 164
This definition creates the potential for millions of individuals, who will
never develop dementia, to receive a diagnosis (or misdiagnosis) of
Mild Neurocognitive Disorder. 165 Although diagnosis nominally
requires an objective cognitive assessment, even the DSM-5’s
Neurocognitive Disorders Work Group recognized that truly objective
clinical assessments may be problematic. 166 Frances argues that even if
primary care physicians do not ignore the need for a formal neurological
assessment, such assessments would do little to prevent false positives,
if, as now, it is designed to include more than 13% of the population. 167
The problems with misdiagnosis of Mild Neurocognitive Disorder
extend beyond the medical context and into the employment
relationship. In distinguishing ADA and ADEA claims, the Seventh
Circuit cautioned that old age “does not define a discrete and insular
minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans,
will experience it.” 168 The ADEA protects older employees from
discrimination, but the ADEA “does not include any additional
considerations for identifying ‘qualified individuals’ that might be
analogized to the ‘reasonable accommodation’ language of the
ADA.” 169 However, the ADA carries with it a duty to provide a
reasonable accommodation for a disability. Older employees with some
expected, age-related decline in cognitive performance could begin
claiming job-related accommodations for these cognitive deficits using
162. Allen Frances, Opening Pandora’s Box: The 19 Worst Suggestions for DSM5,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/dsm/content/article/
10168/1522341 [hereinafter Frances, Opening Pandora’s Box].
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See S 03 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, supra note 148 (“[S]ymptom reports may be
unavailable or unreliable, observation may be less informative, the interpretation of objective
assessments is complicated by variable premorbid abilities, and simpler assessments are likely to
be insensitive.”).
167. See Frances, Opening Pandora’s Box, supra note 162 (“[G]etting a meaningful reference
point is impossible in most instances and the threshold has been set to include a whopping 13.5%
of the population . . . .”).
168. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for N.E. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 945,
950, (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000)).
169. Detz v. Greiner Indus., Inc., 346 F.3d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 2003).
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the DSM-5’s Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, thereby transforming their
ADEA claims into ones under the ADA and pursuing redress for a
phenomenon that all individuals could eventually experience.
As discussed above, the ADAAA has already lowered the bar for
what constitutes a “disability” or what “substantially limits” a major life
activity. The proposed Mild Neurocognitive Disorder definition
included the key phrase that “accommodation may be required.” 170
While commentators have rightly argued that the ADEA has failed to
address the continued emergence of ageist stereotypes and associated
discrimination, 171 the “remedy” of pushing (eventually) every employee
and employer through the ADA interactive process by default would
create obvious administrative and logistical nightmares for both parties.
3. Social Communication Disorder
Another puzzling proposed addition to the DSM-5 is “Social
Communication Disorder.” 172 Categorized as a neurodevelopment
disorder with language and speech disorders like ADHD, autism, and
Tourette Syndrome, 173 the proposed DSM-5 defines Social
Communication Disorder as “low social communication abilities
result[ing] in functional limitations in effective communication, social
participation, academic achievement, or occupational performance,
alone or in any combination.” 174 Another one of the diagnostic criteria
suggests that people with ongoing difficulties in verbal and nonverbal
communication that affect the “development of social reciprocity and
social relationships” meet the DSM-5 proposed definition. 175 While this
definition may fit individuals with forms of autism who otherwise fall
short of the DSM diagnostic criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder, the
DSM Task Force defined it so broadly that it could also match just about
any of the “geeks, sportos, motorheads, dweebs, dorks, sluts,
buttheads” 176 or other individuals in a workplace who might struggle to
fit in due to their particular eccentricities. With the lowered ADAAA
170. S 03 Mild Neurocognitive Disorder, supra note 148.
171. See, e.g., Judith J. Johnson, Reasonable Factors Other than Age: The Emerging Specter
of Ageist Stereotypes, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 49, 49 (2009) (arguing that because courts,
including the Supreme Court, are allowing employers “to interpose defenses that correlate so
strongly with age that they can be used as thinly veiled covers for discrimination,” the protections
afforded under the ADEA are still in danger despite attempts at reform).
172. 04 Social Communication Disorder, supra note 149.
173. See Neurodevelopmental Disorders, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/
ProposedRevision/Pages/NeurodevelopmentalDisorders.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
174. 04 Social Communication Disorder, supra note 149.
175. Id.
176. FERRIS BUELLER’S DAY OFF (Paramount Pictures 1986) (Grace, Principal Ed Rooney’s
secretary, explaining to Rooney why everyone thought Ferris was a “righteous dude”).
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bar, tens of thousands of employees and their employers could
potentially and unnecessarily face the ADA interactive process (or
decline to do so at great expense). 177 Despite the above reference to a
classic ’80s film, 178 the concern about employees who do not “fit in” is
not a trivial one in the workplace. The management-side labor and
employment law firm where I practice 179 represents many employers
who have specifically expressed concerns about managing employees
with eccentricities and quirks. Adding the possibility of an ADA
discrimination claim to the mix of a harassment investigation, a routine
disciplinary matter, or other employment issue unnecessarily
complicates the employer/employee relationship at best, and leads to a
parade of horribles for both employee and employer at worst.
4. Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder
Another proposed addition to the DSM-5 is the obtusely named
“Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder.” 180 The
proposed DSM-5 lists this new disorder among disruptive, impulse
control, and conduct disorders such as Oppositional Defiant Disorder
and Intermittent Explosive Disorder. 181 To meet the diagnostic criteria,
an individual need only fail to “show concern about poor/problematic
performance at school, work, or in other important activities” and seem
“shallow, insincere, or superficial.” 182 As with Social Communication
Disorder, Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder
would medicalize what others categorize as part of the human
condition. 183 Conceivably, an employer that places an employee on a
performance improvement plan because of the employee’s failure to
correct deficient job performance could be met with threats of an ADA
discrimination claim. Again, using the DSM-5 as support, the focus of a
performance plan could easily shift from rebuilding a successful
employee/employer relationship to negotiating the employee’s exit, or
worse.

177. See generally Walter Olson, Revised DSM-5 Could Open Up Wider Legal Claims, CATO
INST. (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/revised-dsm-5-could-open-up-wider-legalclaims/ (highlighting some of the “serious legal risks” that employers face).
178. See FERRIS BUELLER’S DAY OFF, supra note 176.
179. FRANCZEK RADELET, P.C., http://www.franczek.com/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
180. Q 02.1 Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder, supra note 150.
181. See DSM-5, Disruptive, Impulse Control, and Conduct Disorders, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS’N,
http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/Disruptive,ImpulseControl,andConduct
Disorders.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
182. Q 02.1 Callous and Unemotional Specifier for Conduct Disorder, supra note 150.
183. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text (providing satirical commentary on
medicalization of the human condition).
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5. Modifications to Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized
Anxiety Disorder
The DSM-5’s changes are not limited to the addition of disorders that
skeptical courts could dismiss or ignore. The APA’s Board of Trustees
has approved the removal of the implicit “bereavement exclusion” from
the diagnostic definition of Major Depressive Disorder, a disorder that
consists of one or more Major Depressive Episodes. 184 The DSM-IV’s
definition of Major Depressive Episode 185 specifically exempted
bereavement or other events involving a significant loss, even when
symptoms lasted the requisite two weeks. 186 The DSM-5’s proposed
criteria, however, reversed this definition, explicitly stating that the
“normal and expected response to an event involving significant loss
(e.g., bereavement, financial ruin, or natural disaster) may resemble a
depressive episode,” and when combined with symptoms of other
functional impairments “suggest the presence of a Major Depressive
Episode.” 187
Under this new definition, individuals whose grief, a normal life
process, resembles a major depressive episode (e.g., two weeks of
symptoms such as a depressed mood, loss of appetite, fatigue, trouble
thinking or concentrating, insomnia, and loss of interest in or pleasure
from activities) immediately after a major financial loss or the death of
a loved one would be properly diagnosed with Major Depressive
Disorder. 188
This significant change will likely increase the diagnosis of Major
Depressive Disorder and medicalize normal grief. 189 Allen Frances
labeled this change another of the “19 worst” in the DSM-5. 190 From a
legal standpoint, the DSM-5’s transformation of grief into a diagnosable
mental illness means that employers’ “bereavement leave” policies may
no longer suffice. Instead, employers and employees could again be
forced through the ADA interactive process, FMLA leave discussions,
184. See APA Approves DSM-5, supra note 5, at 4 (announcing that the bereavement
exclusion “has been removed and replaced by several notes within the text delineating the
differences between grief and depression”). See also sources cited supra note 151 (discussing
Major Depressive Disorder).
185. See Major Depressive Episode, AM. PSYCHOLOGICALASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/
ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=427 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Frances, Opening Pandora’s Box, supra note 162.
190. See id. (“This is radical and astounding change that may be helpful for some individuals,
but will cause a huge false positive problem―especially since there is so much individual and
cultural variability in bereavement. Of course, grief would become an extremely inviting target
for the drug companies.”).
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and other unnecessary legal discussions.
Another suggested change in the DSM-5 is to the definition of
While the general criteria—
Generalized Anxiety Disorder. 191
restlessness, anxiety and worry, distress, and impairment of social
functioning—remain largely unchanged, the proposed DSM-5 lowers
the threshold of these symptoms for diagnosis. 192 First, the DSM-5
reduces the required duration of these symptoms to just three months. 193
Second, the DSM-5 proposal reduces the number of different associated
behaviors required for diagnosis. 194 Under the DSM-IV, patients
needed to exhibit three out of the following six behaviors: restlessness,
fatigue, difficulty concentrating, irritability, muscle tension, or sleep
disturbance. 195 The DSM-5 proposal requires that patients only show
either restlessness or muscle tension, and one of the following
conditions: avoidance of activities, excessive time and effort to prepare
for activities, procrastination, or seeking reassurance from others due to
worries. 196 Critics have characterized the rationale for these “radical
changes” as “completely unconvincing” and “remarkably thin.” 197 The
proposed criteria not only significantly lower the diagnostic threshold
for Generalized Anxiety Disorder, but the DSM-5’s revised list of
symptoms seems difficult to distinguish from the normal anxieties of
everyday life. As with the confirmed removal of the bereavement
exclusion, the DSM-5’s proposed identification of these everyday
anxieties as a mental disorder would also force employers and
employees into the ADA interactive process, FMLA leave discussions,
and other lengthy and unnecessary legal discussions.
6. Outside Proposals under Consideration for the DSM-5
The DSM-5 has also proposed a significant change to the definition
of a Mental Disorder to remove the DSM-IV’s exclusion of both deviant
(e.g., political, religious, or sexual) behavior and primary conflicts
between the individual and society from the definition. 198 The DSM-IV
191. See E 05 Generalized Anxiety Disorder, supra note 152.
192. See id. (providing DSM-5 and DSM-IV definitions of Generalized Anxiety Disorder).
193. Dr. Frances notes that the original proposal lowered the threshold to just one month.
Allen Frances, DSM 5 Will Medicalize Everyday Worries into Generalized Anxiety Disorder: An
Example of Sloppy DSM 5 Methods, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.psychology
today.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201104/dsm-5-will-medicalize-everyday-worries-generalizedanxiety-disorder [hereinafter Frances, Generalized Anxiety Disorder]
194. See E 05 Generalized Anxiety Disorder, supra note 152.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Frances, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, supra note 193.
198. See Definition of a Mental Disorder, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/
ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=465 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
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logically excluded deviance and conflict from the definition, except to
the extent they were symptoms of another, diagnosable dysfunction. 199
In contrast, the proposed DSM-5 suggests that a mental disorder can
be the result of these factors, so long as they are not “primarily” the
cause. 200 Medical critics have observed that the lack of consensus as to
the “primary” causes of mental distress could result in practitioners
classifying sociopolitical deviance as a mental disorder. 201 In most
jurisdictions, political affiliation is not a protected class; a private
employer can, in most cases, make employment decisions based on an
employee’s political affiliation. 202 However, if holding radical
sociopolitical philosophy beliefs can establish a mental health disorder,
then a Neopaganist 203 could claim that his pro-racist, pro-Nazi beliefs
are part of a mental health disorder and seek protection under the
ADA. 204
In recent years, news reports have highlighted a British poll 205 and an
American Academy of Pediatrics report in the journal Pediatrics 206 that
discussed the empirically questionable “Internet Addiction Disorder.”
Internet Addiction Disorder was originally proposed as a satirical hoax
199. Id. (providing DSM-IV definition).
200. Id. (using the same definition, but inserting the modifier “primarily”).
201. See Open Letter to the DSM-5, supra note 133 and accompanying text. The Open Letter
addressed this deviant behavior change in detail:
Taken literally, DSM-5’s version suggests that mental disorder may be the result of
these factors so long as they are not “primarily” the cause. In other words, this change
will require the clinician to draw on subjective etiological theory to make a judgment
about the cause of presenting problems. It will further require the clinician to make a
hierarchical decision about the primacy of these causal factors, which will then
(partially) determine whether mental disorder is said to be present. Given lack of
consensus as to the “primary” causes of mental distress, this proposed change may
result in the labeling of sociopolitical deviance as mental disorder.
Id.
202. See, e.g., Ill. Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-102 (2012) (defining protected classes);
Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151B, § 4 (same). See also, e.g., Nguyen v. Univ. of Mass., 846 N.E.2d
1184, 1188 (Mass. Ct. App. 2006) (“[Massachusetts laws] do not provide protection for political
beliefs.”).
203. See generally HELEN A. BERGER, WITCHCRAFT AND MAGIC: CONTEMPORARY NORTH
AMERICA 4, 45–54 (2006) (discussing neopaganism and its pro-racist and pro-Nazi sects).
204. In theory, this definition could stretch further to “Birthers,” conspiracy theorists,
Holocaust deniers, or any manner of sociopolitical beliefs outside the “mainstream.”
205. John Joseph, Nearly Half of Britons Suffer “Discomgoogolation,” REUTERS (Sept. 1,
2008),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/09/01/us-britain-internet-idUKL146220120080901
(discussing a poll that “found 76 percent of Britons could not live without the Internet, with over
half of the population using the web between one and four hours a day and 19 percent of people
spending more time online than with their family in a week”).
206. Gwenn Schurgin O’Keeffe & Kathleen Clarke-Pearson, Clinical Report—The Impact of
Social Media on Children, Adolescents, and Families, 127 PEDIATRICS 800 (2011), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2011/03/28/peds.2011-0054.full.pdf+html.
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by Dr. Ivan Goldberg in 1995, modeled after the DSM-IV’s diagnostic
criteria for pathological gambling. 207 Despite the general lack of
support in medical studies for this addiction, 208 the APA is nonetheless
considering adding the disorder category to the DSM-5. 209
As discussed above, the APA is also considering, or has explicity
approved, the addition of conditions that outside sources suggested—
such as “Apathy Syndrome,” “Internet Addiction,” and “Seasonal
Affective Disorder”—as psychiatric disorders for further study. 210
Medical literature defines apathy syndrome as “a syndrome of primary
motivational loss, that is, loss of motivation not attributable to
emotional distress, intellectual impairment, or diminished level of
consciousness.” 211 If adopted, an apathetic, unmotivated employee
would arguably qualify for ADA protection. An employee who has no
motivation to work on Fridays due to DSM-5-blessed Apathy Syndrome
would qualify for entrance into the interactive ADA accommodation
process with their employers if he or she can show an ability to perform
the core functions of the job with a reasonable accommodation.
V. LIVING WITH THE DSM-5
Although the “recklessly expansive suggestions go on and on,” 212
they reflect a fundamental change in the DSM that may require the legal
community to remove the Manual from its current lofty perch of
authority. The removal of the multiaxial system, 213 and proposed
207. Ivan Goldberg, Posting to PSYCOM.NET (Mar. 16, 1995 5:06 PM), http://web.urz.uniheidelberg.de/Netzdienste/anleitung/wwwtips/8/addict.html. See also Anne Federwisch, Internet
Addiction, NURSE.COM (Aug. 8, 1997), http://www.nurseweek.com/features/97-8/iadct.html
(describing Dr. Goldberg’s spoof).
208. See, e.g., John M. Grohol, Pediatrics Gets It Wrong about ‘Facebook Depression,’
PSYCHCENTRAL (Mar. 28, 2011), http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2011/03/28/pediatricsgets-it-wrong-about-facebook-depression/ (detailing lack of medical evidence to support the
report in Pediatrics).
209. See Conditions Proposed by Outside Sources, supra note 153. At least one federal court
has spoken on the issue of Internet sex addictions and denied ADA protection because of the
Act’s sexual disorder exceptions. Pacenza v. IBM Corp., 363 F. App’x 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2010)
(affirming district court holding that sex addiction is not a disability under the ADA and that sex
addiction symptoms do not put employer on notice of employee’s PTSD), aff’g No. 04 Civ. 5831
(PGG), 2009 WL 890060 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009).
210. See Conditions Proposed by Outside Sources, supra note 153.
211. Robert S. Marin, Apathy: A Neuropsychiatric Syndrome, 3 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY &
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 243–46 (1991). The DSM-5 website does not include definitions for
these disorders, indicating that the work groups are “further assessing the evidence” before
making a recommendation. See Conditions Proposed by Outside Sources, supra note 153.
212. See Frances, It’s Not Too Late, supra note 128 (discussing some of the “most egregious
invasions of normality suggested for DSM-V”).
213. See APA Approves DSM-5, supra note 5, at 2 (announcing that the “DSM-5 will move to
a nonaxial documentation of diagnosis”). For more information about the multiaxial system, see
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changes like those described above, reflect the DSM’s continued move
towards a spectrum model of mental illness. 214 This involves the
“clustering of disorders into illness spectra (e.g., psychotic, bipolar,
cognitive) and extension farther into the softer ends of these spectra,” 215
meaning that the DSM will increasingly attempt to capture “the subthreshold (e.g., minor depression, mild cognitive disorder) or premorbid
(e.g., prepsychotic) versions of the existing official disorders.” 216 I
agree with both medical and nonmedical critics who contend that the
DSM-5 will create millions of new diagnosed “illnesses,” whether or not
they exist medically (or legally). Dr. Frances writes that it will be “a
bonanza for the pharmaceutical industry but at a huge cost to the new
false-positive patients caught in the excessively wide [DSM-5] net.” 217
Importantly, though, the cost also extends to the legal community.
The threshold coverage issue of “disability” has been defined into
virtual irrelevance under the ADAAA, 218 the EEOC’s regulations, 219
and recent case law. 220 As individuals learn more about the new DSM5 mental disorders and the ADAAA’s relaxed definition of “disability,”
more individuals will request accommodation. While the wider DSM-5
net will undoubtedly catch individuals unfairly excluded from the
interactive process under the DSM-IV and pre-ADAAA regimes, it will
also attract others who want to game the system. The regulatory impact
analysis that accompanied the proposed regulations recited that as many
as one million additional individuals may consistently meet the
text accompanying notes 26 and 40.
214. Frances, It’s Not Too Late, supra note 128. See also Joseph M. Pierre, The Borders of
Mental Disorder in Psychiatry and the DSM: Past, Present, and Future, 16 J. PSYCHIATRIC
PRAC. 375, 378–79 (2010) (discussing the DSM’s spectral model in the context of personality
disorders).
215. Pierre, supra note 214, at 379.
216. Allen Frances, A Warning Sign on the Road to DSM-V: Beware of its Unintended
Consequences, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (June 26, 2009), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/print/
article/10168/1425378?printable=true.
217. Id.
218. See ADAAA, § 2 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006)) (reciting findings and
purposes).
219. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2012) (explaining that under the ADAAA, an
impairment is a disability within the meaning of the statute where “it substantially limits the
ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general
population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual
from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting”); id.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would
substantially limit a major life activity when active.”).
220. See Villanti v. Cold Spring Harbor Cent. Sch. Dist., 733 F. Supp. 2d 371, 377 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (“The ADAAA substantially broadened the definition of a ‘disability’ under the law, and
explicitly overturned the Supreme Court's holdings in [Sutton] and [Toyota], which had defined
the statutory terms ‘substantially limits’ and ‘major life activities’ strictly.”).
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ADAAA’s definition of “disability,” costing employers as much as
$235 million per year over five years for additional accommodations. 221
With the relaxation of the DSM-5’s standards, one million presumably
unfairly excluded individuals may pale in comparison to the total
number of newly “disabled” individuals under the DSM-5.
Although the ADAAA, combined with the release of the DSM-5, may
create significant uncertainty, the legal community can take steps to
limit this dangerous interaction. Regardless of the relative wisdom of
the DSM-5 approach for the medical community, the “spectralization”
of mental illness 222 means that legal practitioners, including courts and
government agencies, must take seriously the admonitions in the DSMIV 223 (which will presumably carry over to the DSM-5) and remove the
DSM from its lofty pedestal of authority. Even though the ADAAA has
drastically lowered the bar for determining a disability and when that
disability substantially limits a major life activity, courts must retain the
healthy skepticism of medical evidence that they employed in the preADAAA landscape. 224
Even under the ADAAA, medical diagnoses should not automatically
qualify an individual for a legal “diagnosis” of disability. It is simply
not the case that most individuals diagnosed with impairments on the
spectrum of mental disorders are disabled as a matter of law. The DSMIV itself admonishes that because of the “imperfect fit between the
questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained
in a clinical diagnosis[,] in most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a
DSM-IV mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for
legal purposes of a ‘mental disorder,’ ‘mental disability,’ ‘mental
disease,’ or ‘mental defect.’” 225 Instead, the DSM-IV reminds the legal
community that, “[w]hen used appropriately, diagnoses and diagnostic
information can assist decision makers in their determinations.” 226
As one court noted, “additional information . . . beyond that
221. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48431, 48437 (Sept. 23, 2009) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 (2012)) (listing the proposed regulations to the ADAAA).
222. See Pierre, supra note 214, at 377–79 (discussing the diagnostic spectra for mental
disorders).
223. See supra notes 33–40, 71 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Rolland v. Potter, 492 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (discounting medical
evidence in light of plaintiff’s ability to perform work); Squibb v. Memorial Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d
775, 784–85 (7th Cir. 2007) (declining to infer certain limitations from medical evidence); Dattoli
v. Principi, 332 F.3d 505, 506–07 (8th Cir. 2003) (discounting medical evidence in light of
plaintiff’s ability to perform daily tasks); Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 186–87
(3rd Cir. 1999) (same); Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1999) (same).
225. DSM-IV, supra note 1, at xxiii
226. Id. at xxxiii.
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contained in the DSM[] diagnosis” is needed to determine whether an
individual’s impairment meets any particular legal standard. 227
Although the statement was removed from the EEOC’s final
regulations, courts should be reminded of the proposed regulations’
statement that disability determinations “often may be made using a
common-sense standard, without resorting to scientific or medical
evidence.” 228 For example, in 1998, the Sixth Circuit noted in dicta that
the “inability to drive in darkness is a common phenomenon that, if
classified as disabling, would make most of the American population
over the age of 45 ‘disabled’ under the Act.” 229 As the DSM moves
further and further away from ADA jurisprudence, courts must reassess
their deference to it and return the DSM to its proper place as one more
piece of evidence that assists, but not directs, the outcome of a matter.
At the same time, employers and employees cannot rely solely on the
court system to address these burdens. In states like Connecticut that
explicitly adopt the latest edition of the DSM as the foundation of
employment discrimination law, 230 employers and employees cannot
avoid the consequences of the APA’s decisions. Outside the courts, the
“spectralized” DSM-5, combined with the lower standards in the
ADAAA, will increase non-litigation costs for employers and
employees because of the increased attention to the interactive process
and the increase in employees requesting accommodation. Employers
must assume that most individuals requesting accommodation would be
found “disabled” under the ADAAA or at least would raise enough factintensive issues to lead to more extensive (and expensive) discovery,
and even to trial. As much as some employers may want to chuckle at
the absurdity of an older employee seeking accommodation for Mild
Neurocognitive Disorder, they still must pay more attention to the
interactive process in order to minimize exposure for failure to
accommodate claims and the uncertainty of litigation. 231

227. Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 155 n.18 (1st Cir. 1998).
228. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48431, 48440 (Sept. 23, 2009) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 (2012)).
229. Wade v. Gen. Motors Corp., 165 F.3d 29 (table), 1998 WL 639162, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept.
10, 1998).
230. See supra note 146 (noting that the Connecticut employment discrimination statutes
explicitly refer to the APA’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’).
231. Of course, even if employers have no legal obligation to accommodate certain
employees, employers should still consider affording reasonable accommodations of some sort.
Providing a reasonable, appropriate accommodation, whether legally mandated or not, is often
simpler and more cost-effective than determining whether a legal duty exists and how to calibrate
the appropriate accommodation to both the disability and the law.
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CONCLUSION
Regardless of what the APA’s Board of Trustees finally approves in
the DSM-5, as a legal matter, prudent employers should assume that all
but the most transitory and minor of impairments (the common cold or
flu, a sprained ankle, or a pulled hamstring) will be found to be
“disabilities.” To fulfill their legal obligations under the ADA,
employers should respond to all requests for accommodation, even if
the diagnosed “impairment” seems ludicrous on its face. Careful
preparation for and engagement in the interactive ADA accommodation
process will minimize exposure for failure to accommodate claims and
focus both parties on the issues most relevant to post-ADAAA litigation
(i.e., whether the employee is “qualified” and what motivations the
employer has for its actions).
This Article casts a critical eye on the proposed DSM-5. The
additions and general reduction in diagnostic criteria for common
disabilities cited in ADA and FMLA cases, such as Major Depressive
Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder, should bear close scrutiny
both as the May 2013 publication deadline approaches and as medical
and legal practitioners begin relying on the DSM-5 in the coming years.

